When policy makers want to regulate AI, they must first define what AI is. However, legal definitions differ significantly from definitions of other disciplines. They are working definitions. Courts must be able to determine precisely whether or not a concrete system is considered AI by the law. In this paper we examine how policy makers should define the material scope of AI regulations. We argue that they should not use the term "artificial intelligence" for regulatory purposes because there is no definition of AI which meets the requirements for legal definitions. Instead, they should define certain designs, use cases or capabilities following a risk-based approach. The goal of this paper is to help policy makers who work on AI regulations.
Introduction
Policy makers around the world consider regulating AI. The EU seems to have taken the lead in this respect [1] . The European Commission [2, 3, 4] , the European Parliament [5, 6, 7] and the High-Level Expert Group on AI [8, 9] have already published several proposals. In contrast, the USA focus more on removing regulatory barriers [10] . However, they also acknowledge the need for changing existing regulations [11] . In China, AI regulation is a national priority [12] . The Chinese AI strategy contains explicit goals regarding the development of a regulatory framework [13] .
Every regulation needs to define its scope of application. It determines whether or not a regulation is applicable in a particular case. From the regulatee's perspective, it answers the question: "Do I need to apply this regulation?" We can distinguish four dimensions in this respect: the material scope ("what"), the personal scope ("who"), the territorial scope ("where") and the temporal scope ("when"). In this paper we focus on the material scope. The material scope can refer to an object (e.g. artificial intelligence) and/or an activity (e.g. the development, deployment and use of AI systems). The terms that are used to define the material scope are typically defined at the beginning of the regulation. Such a definition is called a legal definition.
In this paper we examine how policy makers should define the material scope of AI regulations. This seems to be a non-trivial problem for at least two reasons. First, the term "artificial intelligence" is used for many different systems ("it isn't any one thing" [14] ). It can refer to systems that navigate self-driving cars [15] , play video games [16, 17, 18] or make medical diagnoses [19, 20, 21] . From a regulatory perspective, these systems have very different risk profiles and, therefore, must be treated differently. Second, the term is highly ambiguous. There is a vast spectrum of definitions [22, 23, 24] . Its meaning even changes over time ("as soon as it works, no one calls it AI any more" [25] ). So the question is: How should policy makers define AI in legal terms? The problem is known. It has been recognized by literature [26, 27, 14, 28] and policy makers [5, 29, 30, 8] . However, there is not yet a solution. In this paper we structure the problem and suggest possible solutions.
The question how policy makers should define the material scope of AI regulations can be broken down into three subquestions: Which elements should they use (Section 2)? How many elements should they use (Section 3)? Should they define the material scope for the entire regulation and/or for parts of the regulation (Section 4)?
Elements of the Definition
Which elements should policy makers use to define the material scope of AI regulations?
Methodology. We answer this question in four steps: (1) First, we define requirements for legal definitions. Some of the requirements are legally binding, others are good legislative practice. (2) Next, we present four classes of elements which could be used to define the material scope of AI regulations. For each class we present three examples to illustrate the idea. (3) Third, we discuss whether or not the presented definitions meet the requirements for legal definitions. (4) Finally, we make concrete recommendations based on the results of the discussion.
Requirements for Legal Definitions. Legal definitions must meet, among others, the following requirements:
(1) Inclusiveness. Legal definitions must not be over-or under-inclusive [31, 32] . The over-or underinclusiveness refers to the regulatory goal. A definition is over-inclusive when it includes cases which are not in need of regulation according to the regulatory goal. It is under-inclusive when cases which should have been included are not included.
(2) Precision. Legal definitions must be precise. It must be possible to clearly determine whether or not a particular case falls under the definition. Ideally, all elements of the definition are dichotomous, i.e. conditions are either met or not. There should not be a range of how much a condition is met.
(3) Comprehensiveness. Legal definitions must be comprehensive. Regulatees must be able to understand whether or not the regulation is applicable in order to adjust their behavior accordingly. The definition should, therefore, be based on the existing meaning of terms and comply with the natural use of language. At least in principle, people without expert knowledge should be able to apply the definition.
(4) Practicability. Legal definitions should be practicable. Regulatees, courts, government authorities and lawyers must be able to determine with little effort whether or not a concrete case falls under the definition. The assessment of every element should be possible on the basis of the information typically available to them.
(5) Permanence. Legal definitions should be permanent. Policy makers should not use elements which are likely to change in the near future. The need for legislative updating should be avoided.
The first three requirements are legally binding (at least in some jurisdictions). For example, the criterion inclusiveness can be derived from the principle of proportionality in EU law. Pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union 1 , "the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties". The criteria precision and comprehensiveness are based on the principle of legal certainty in EU law and the vagueness doctrine in U.S. law. Policy makers in the EU are required to ensure "that Community rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly" [33] . Similarly, the U.S. vagueness doctrine states: "A criminal statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application lacks the first essential of due process of law" [34] . The other two criteria practicability and permanence are not legally binding. Instead, they should be seen as good legislative practice.
In the following, we discuss four classes of elements: artificial intelligence (Section 2.1), design (Section 2.2), use cases (Section 2.3) and capabilities (Section 2.4).
Artificial Intelligence
The most obvious approach would be to use the term "artificial intelligence". The material scope could then be formulated as follows:
This regulation applies to the development, deployment and use of AI systems.
However, there is no generally accepted definition of the term "artificial intelligence". Since its first usage by John McCarthy in 1955 [35] , a vast spectrum of definitions has emerged. In the following, we discuss three of the most popular definitions. For a more comprehensive collection of definitions we refer to the relevant literature [22, 23, 24] .
Example 1 (Turing Test) . The Turing test is arguably the best known AI definition. In 1950, Allan Turing proposed a test which he called "imitation game" [36] . Based on this test, AI could be defined as follows:
"Artificial intelligence" means any computer that passes the Turing test.
"Turing test" means a game which is played with three participants: (1) a human, (2) a computer and (3) a human judge. The human judge is separated from the other two participants. They can only communicate via text. The Turing test is passed if the human judge cannot effectively discriminate between the human and the computer.
Example 2. Another popular definition goes back to John McCarthy. In 2007, he published the paper "What is Artificial Intelligence?" [37] . In this paper he defines AI as follows:
"Artificial intelligence" means the science and engineering of making intelligent machines.
"Intelligence" means the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world. "Agent" means a software system which perceives its environment through sensors and acts upon that environment through actuators.
"Intelligence" means the ability to select an action that is expected to maximize a performance measure.
Discussion. Do the above mentioned definitions meet the requirements for legal definitions? Inclusiveness: From a regulatory perspective, all three definitions are highly over-inclusive. For example, the ability to achieve goals can be ascribed to many systems which are obviously not in need of regulation (e.g. calculators). The same holds true for the ability to select an action that is expected to maximize a performance measure [27] . We would even argue that all AI definitions are inherently over-inclusive. It seems impossible to define AI in a way that is not over-inclusive. Due to its broadness, the term will always include many different systems. These systems will have very different risk profiles and, therefore, must be treated differently. A single definition of AI is unable to cope with the complexity of possible regulatory goals ("there is no one-size-fits-all"). Apart from that, some AI definitions are also under-inclusive. For example, the Turing test excludes systems which do not communicate in natural language, even though such systems may need regulation (e.g. self-driving cars). Similarly, systems which do not achieve their goals or do not maximize their performance measure would be excluded, even though they can pose significant risks [27] . Precision: Most AI definitions are highly vague. McCarthy's definition simply replaces one difficult-to-define term (intelligence) with another (goal) [27] . The intelligent agent definition is equally vague, especially with regard to its notion of bounded rationality. In many cases, it is impossible to determine ex-ante whether or not a concrete action is expected to maximize a performance measure because ground truth is unattainable. Even if it was, no system can always select the ideal action. How often does a system need to select the ideal action in order to be considered intelligent? It could be argued that the Turing test is more precise, given the empirical nature of the test. However, the test results can still be debatable. For example, it has been claimed that a chat bot named "Eugene Goostman" has passed the test in 2014 [38, 39] . However, this claim has not been recognized by the vast majority of AI researchers [40] . Comprehensiveness: It seems debatable whether or not the above mentioned AI definitions are comprehensive. Practicability: Their practicability is also debatable. It may be possible to determine whether or not a system is able to achieve goals or maximize a performance measure on the basis of typically available information. However, the Turing test is highly impracticable. Courts will not be able to conduct the test every time they have to decide whether or not a system is considered AI by the law. Permanence: The definitions seem to be sufficiently permanent. For example, the Turing test is almost 70 years old.
Recommendation. Policy makers should not use the term "artificial intelligence" for regulatory purposes. There is no definition of AI which meets the requirements for legal definitions. Instead, policy makers should adopt a risk-based approach: (1) they should decide which specific risk they want to address, (2) identify which property of the system is responsible for that risk and (3) precisely define that property. In other words, the starting point should be the underlying risk, not the term AI.
Design
Policy makers could define how AI systems are designed ("how it's made"). This class of elements could be used to address the inherent risks of certain technical approaches.
Example 4 (Reinforcement Learning). For example, the material scope could be limited to systems based on reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning is used in many real-world AI systems, such as games [16, 41, 42] , robotics [43] and recommender systems [44] . Policy makers may want to address certain safety risks which are directly linked to reinforcement learning. This includes, among others, reward hacking [45, 46] and interruptibility [47] . The following definition could be used:
"Reinforcement learning" means the machine learning task of learning a policy from reward signals that maximizes a value function [48] .
Example 5 (Supervised and Unsupervised Learning). Policy makers could also define supervised and unsupervised learning. These techniques are equally popular. For example, they are used for image recognition [49] , speech recognition [50] and text detection [51] . Policy makers could use these elements to prevent certain kinds of discrimination. In particular, they could address the inherent risk of supervised and unsupervised learning to reproduce biases which were contained in the training data [52, 53] . The elements could be defined as follows:
"Supervised learning" means the machine learning task of learning a function that maps from an input to an output based on labeled input-output pairs [22] .
"Unsupervised learning" means the machine learning task of learning patterns in an input even though no explicit feedback is supplied [22] .
Example 6 (Artificial Neural Networks). Another approach would be to define artificial neural networks. Many machine learning algorithms are based on them. They are responsible for several problematic attributes, such as interpretability [54] and foreseeability [27, 55] . From a regulatory perspective, these attributes pose certain risks (e.g. regarding the liability for damages caused by an AI system). Policy makers could use this element to address these risks. Artificial neural networks could be defined as follows:
"Artificial neural network" means a software architecture which is composed of units connected by directed links. Each link has a numeric weight associated with it which determines the strength and sign of the connection. Each unit first computes the weighted sum of its inputs. Then it applies an activation function to derive the output [22] .
Discussion. Inclusiveness: Most design definitions are over-inclusive. There will always be systems which use one of the above mentioned designs which should not be subject to regulation (e.g. game-playing agents based on reinforcement learning). Precision: A system's design can be defined precisely. It is easy to determine whether or not a concrete system is designed in a certain way. Comprehensiveness: It seems debatable whether or not design definitions are comprehensive. On the one hand, they require some degree of technical know-how. Today, the average judge would probably not be able to apply them. On the other hand, this might change as AI regulations enter into force and know-how is required. There are already areas of law which require some degree of technical know-how (e.g. IT law). Practicability: The definitions are also practicable. The required information are easy to obtain. Permanence: The permanence, however, is unknown. It is highly uncertain whether today's technical approaches will be used in the future [56] .
Recommendation. Under some conditions, it seems reasonable to use elements of this class. First, policy makers need to be aware that this requires technology-specific regulation. This might not be intended [57] . Second, in order to avoid over-inclusiveness, policy makers should combine elements of this class with elements of other classes. Third, there seems to be a trade-off between precision and permanence. Defining concrete algorithms (e.g. support vector machines) or libraries (e.g. TensorFlow) would be more precise, but less permanent. Defining abstract approaches (e.g. symbolic or sub-symbolic) would be more permanent, but less precise.
Use Case
Policy makers could also define certain use cases ("what it's used for"). Many risks do not result from the system itself, but from its usage.
Example 7 (Self-Driving Cars). For example, policy makers may want to regulate self-driving cars [11, 58, 59] . They could pursue a wide range of regulatory goals in this respect, such as road safety and security. In the following, we use the definitions developed by SAE International [60] . Since 2014 they publish the technical standard "SAE J3016" which contains definitions for six levels of automation (Level 0-5). These definitions have been adopted by policy makers in the USA [11] and the EU [59] . They could be formulated as follows:
This regulation applies to highly and fully automated driving systems.
"High automation" means the driving mode-specific performance by an automated driving system of all aspects of the dynamic driving task, even if a human driver does not respond appropriately to a request to intervene. "Full automation" means the full-time performance by an automated driving system of all aspects of the dynamic driving task under all roadway and environmental conditions that can be managed by a human driver.
"Automated driving system" means the hardware and software that are collectively capable of performing the entire dynamic driving task on a sustained basis, regardless of whether it is limited to a specific operational design domain.
"Dynamic driving task" means all of the real-time operational and tactical functions required to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic, excluding the strategic functions such as trip scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints.
Example 8 (Facial Recognition). Another example is facial recognition. Facial recognition is used to tag photos on social media [61] , unlock smartphones [62, 63] as well as state surveillance [64, 65, 66] . However, the technology can have gender or race biases [67, 68] . It also raises severe privacy concerns [69] . In 2018, Microsoft had already called for public regulation [70, 71] . In 2019, San Francisco banned the purchase and use of facial recognition technology by city personnel [72] . Facial recognition can be defined as follows:
"Facial recognition" means the automated identification of a person from a digital image or video.
Example 9 (Medical Diagnosis). A third example is medical diagnosis. In many domains, AI systems match or exceed human performance in visual medical diagnosis [19, 20, 21] . These systems are increasingly deployed in hospitals. However, they can pose significant risks-they can literally be a matter of life and death [73] . The element could be defined as follows:
"Medical diagnosis" means the process of determining the nature of a disease or disorder and distinguishing it from other possible conditions [74] .
Discussion. Inclusiveness: Definitions of use cases are not inherently over-or under-inclusive. In most cases, the regulatory goal will be to reduce certain use case-specific risks. Precision: Use cases can be defined precisely. There is no apparent reason why this might not be possible. Comprehensiveness: They can also be defined in a comprehensive way. Practicability: We have no concerns regarding the practicability of such definitions. Permanence: Their permanence, however, is debatable. On the one hand, some use cases are unlikely to change (e.g. self-driving cars). On the other hand, almost certainly new use cases will occur.
Recommendation. We highly recommend to use this class of elements. However, policy makers should keep in mind that this will require a sector-specific regulation. It might also require a moderate degree of legislative updating.
Capability
Policy makers could also define certain capabilities ("what it can do"). Some risks do not necessarily result from certain designs or use cases. It can be preferable to address these risks directly.
Example 10 (Physical Interaction). For example, the scope could be limited to AI systems which can physically interact with their environment. Only these systems can physically harm people, animals, plants and property. The element could be defined as follows:
"Physical interaction" means the ability to use sensors to perceive the physical environment and effectors to manipulate this environment [22] .
Example 11 (Automated Decision-Making). Another example is the ability to make automated decisions. Policy makers could use this element to address certain risks resulting from a loss of control [27] . It would exclude systems which only make suggestions while humans make the final decision. This element is already being used in Articles 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and 15(1)(h) of the GDPR. 2 The European Data Protection Board has endorsed the definition by the Article 29 Working Party: "Automated decision-making" means the ability to make decisions by technological means without human involvement [75] .
Example 12 (Legally Relevant Effect). A third example is the ability to make decisions which have a legal or similarly significant effect. From a regulatory perspective, it makes a big difference if a virtual assistant reminds you on your friend's birthday or buys products. For example, the latter may require some degree of consumer protection. This element is also being used in Article 22 of the GDPR. It could be defined as follows:
"Legal effect" means any impact on a person's legal status or their legal rights [75] .
"Similarly significant effect" means any equivalent impact on a person's circumstances, behavior or choices. This may include their financial circumstances, access to health services, employment opportunities or access to education [75] .
Discussion. Inclusiveness: Definitions of capabilities will always be over-and under-inclusive. For example, industrial robots and vending machines both have the ability to physically interact with their environment. Their risk profile is very different though. Precision: Capabilities can be defined precisely. In most cases, they can be formulated in a dichotomous way (e.g. a system either can physically manipulate its environment or not). Comprehensiveness: Such definitions can also be comprehensive. Practicability: They are also practicable. Permanence: They also seem permanent.
Recommendation. We recommend to combine elements of this class with elements of other classes. Capabilities seem particularly well suited to prevent over-inclusiveness. 
Amount of Elements
How many elements should policy makers use to define the material scope of AI regulations?
Single Element. The first impulse might be to simply select one of the above mentioned elements. A single-element definition could be formulated as follows:
This regulation applies to Element 1.
Most of the above mentioned elements could be used as Element 1. The only exception are capabilities, since they need another element which they can refer to ("capability of something"). However, policy makers should not use single-element definitions, unless the regulation is about a specific use case. In Section 2 we have argued that most elements are over-inclusive. Consequently, it seems difficult to come up with a definition which is not over-inclusive by only using a single element. This does not apply for specific use cases (e.g. self-driving cars).
Multiple Elements. Therefore, policy makers should use multiple elements to define the material scope of AI regulations. The basic structure of a multi-element definition looks something like this:
This regulation applies to Element 1 which is used for Element 2 and can do Element 3. Element 1-3 can belong to the same class or different classes. By combining multiple elements, policy makers can narrow down the scope and thereby prevent over-inclusive definitions.
Example 13 (Multi-Element Definitions). The following examples illustrate the idea:
This regulation applies to reinforcement learning agents which can physically interact with their environment and make automated decisions. This regulation applies to software which is used for medical diagnosis and is based on supervised or unsupervised learning.
We recommend to use between two and four elements. This seems to be the optimal range to prevent over-inclusive definitions, while keeping them sufficiently practicable. Definitions based on more than four elements quickly become impracticable.
Scope of the Scope
Should policy makers define the material scope for the entire regulation and/or for parts of the regulation?
Entire Regulation. A definition of the material scope for the entire regulation could be formulated as follows:
This regulation applies to [...] .
Such a definition is typically located at the beginning of the regulation (e.g. Article 2(1) of the GDPR). It would apply to every provision of the regulation, unless there are exemptions or it is overridden by later definitions. However, in most cases, such a definition will not be enough. It seems unlikely that there is a definition of the material scope which is appropriate for all provisions of the entire regulation. There will always be some provisions which shall only apply to certain cases and thus require more specific definitions.
Parts of the Regulation. Therefore, policy makers should always consider defining the material scope for parts of the regulation. By "part" we mean any subset of the regulation (e.g. chapters, sections, provisions). The idea is to define the material scope differently for different subsets: We cannot make any concrete recommendations regarding the scope of the scope. The concrete distribution of different scopes depends on many variables (e.g. the subject of concrete provisions).
Conclusion
Recommendations. In this paper we have examined how policy makers should define the material scope of AI regulations. In particular, we have made the following recommendations:
• Section 2: Policy makers should not use the term "artificial intelligence" for regulatory purposes because there is no definition of AI which meets the requirements for legal definitions. Instead, they should define certain designs, use cases and/or capabilities following a risk-based approach.
• Section 3: Policy makers should not use a single element to define the material scope, unless the regulation is about a specific use case. In most cases, they should use multiple elements.
• Section 4: In most cases, policy makers should define the material scope differently for different parts of the regulation.
Implications. The findings of this paper have further implications for other regulatory questions:
• First, they affect the regulatory approach. In particular, it seems impossible to define the material scope of a cross-sector, technology-neutral regulation. In this case, the definition could not refer to the design and use cases since they would be sector-and technology-specific. The only remaining elements would be AI and capabilities. However, definitions based on these two elements will always be over-inclusive.
• Second, there will be a need for legislative updating. Policy makers should always define certain designs and/or use cases. Both elements are likely to change over time. Consequently, policy makers will have to update the definition of the material scope. A possible solution could be to use a very broad definition on the legislative level which is supplemented by a more specific definition on the non-legislative level (e.g. in administrative provisions). Definitions on the non-legislative level can be updated more easily because they do not need to undergo the legislative process.
• Third, the recommendations apply to definitions by courts and government authorities. In particular, courts and government authorities should resist the temptation to formulate their own AI definition. Again, all definitions of AI will be highly over-inclusive and vague and, therefore, entirely useless for legal purposes.
Open Questions. The following questions remain open:
• How should the material scope of a concrete regulation be formulated? The answer to this question depends on a wide range of variables, such as the regulatory goal, the regulatory approach and the subject of concrete provisions. Therefore, we cannot make any concrete recommendations in this respect.
• In Section 2 we have suggested four classes of elements. Are there other classes? Within each class we have only presented a few examples. Should they be defined differently? Which other elements are in each class?
• Is there a need for exemptions? Typically, there are some cases which fall under the definition of the material scope which should not be included. For example, the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity (Article 2(2)(c) of the GDPR). Which exemptions should be defined in the context of AI regulation?
• In this paper we have focussed on the object of the material scope. How should the corresponding activity be defined? For example, it would be conceivable to define the activities for different phases of the lifecycle of an AI system: development, deployment and use [8] .
• In this paper we have focused on the material scope. How should the other dimensions of the scope of application be defined, i.e. the personal, regional and temporal scope?
• There are many other regulatory questions: Should AI be regulated at all? Which regulatory approach should policy makers take? Which regulatory goals should they pursue? Which policy instruments should they use? How should AI regulations be enforced?
Defining the material scope of AI regulations requires careful consideration. The author hopes that this paper comes at the right time to help policy makers with this challenge.
